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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MATTHEW AUFFHAMMER, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
: Case No. 970073-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 
The City asserts that Auffhammer has failed to marshal all 
the evidence in support of the trial court's conclusion that 
Auffhammer was driving under the influence of alcohol (Br. Of 
Appellee at 8-12). In support of this argument, the City asserts 
that Auffhammer failed to specific facts in support of Judge 
Backlund's decision. 
One, the City asserts that Rasmussen "described the party he 
and Auffhammer had attended as an "alcohol party'" (Br. of 
Appellee at 10). The fact is that Rasmussen was attending an 
"alcohol party" while Auffhammer—whom Rasmussen had not met 
prior to that evening—came to the residence "apartment hunting" 
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to inquire about renting a room (Tr. at 26-27, 38) . See Brief of 
Appellant at 4. 
Two, the City asserts that "Rasmussen unequivocally 
testified that while at the 'alcohol party,' he had seen 
Auffhammer drinking alcoholic beverages'' (Br. of Appellee at 10) . 
However, Rasmussen amended his "unequivocal" testimony on cross-
examination to being "pretty sure... I saw him with a beer at one 
point (Tr. at 55; Brief of Appellant at 5). 
Three, the City asserts that "Rasmussen testified he told 
the police that on the way home from the party, Auffhammer was 
traveling at a high rate of speed" (Br. of Appellee at 10) . 
Actually, Rasmussen's testimony was only that Auffhammer was 
"over the speed limit" (Tr. at 30). The "high rate of speed" 
language comes only from the prosecutor's question (Id.). 
Four, the City asserts that Auffhammer has failed to marshal 
the evidence concerning a prior intersection with a "stop" sign 
(Br. of Appellee at 10). However, the citation referred to by 
the City concerns dialogue between the Court and Rasmussen which 
the City has taken out of context. Rasmussen testified that he 
might have stopped differently at a previous stop sign (Tr. at 
41-42; Br. of Appellant at 5) and the trial court was not certain 
whether he meant the stop sign at the site of the accident or 
"some earlier stop sign" so he asked Rasmussen about it (Tr. at 
58-59). Rasmussen clarified that it was an earlier stop sign and 
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that Auffhammer had basically executed a rolling stop past the 
"sign a little bit" (Tr. at 59). At this point the judge 
responded "All right. And that was it? That's all you were 
talking about?" (Id.). Rasmussen then replied "yeah" (Id.). 
Five, the City asserts that Rasmussen testified that 
"Auffhammer was slow to respond to the stop sign" at the site of 
the accident (Br. of Appellee at 10). Actually, that language 
comes from the prosecutor's question to which Rasmussen replied 
"Yeah. I mean—" (Tr. at 31-32). But Rasmussen testified 
further that what happened at the stop sign was "it just kind of 
came, came upon us as a surprise" and that he could not see the 
stop sign located where the accident occurred prior to reaching 
the intersection (Tr. at 32, 42; Br. of Appellant at 6). 
Six, Auffhammer clearly indicates that Rasmussen testified 
that he told Auffhammer after the accident not to leave the scene 
but that Auffhammer left anyway (Br. of Appellant at 6). The 
City's assertion that Rasmussen's testimony clearly indicates 
"Auffhammer wanted to avoid being identified at the scene so 
shortly after he had been to an "alcohol party" (Br. of Appellee 
at 10) is not a fact that Auffhammer has failed to marshal but an 
inappropriate inference given the known facts of the case. 
Seven, the facts surrounding Rasmussen's testimony about his 
statement to the police, Officer Carter's discussion with 
Auffhammer at the hospital on the next day, and Officer Smith's 
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dialogue with Auffhammer are clearly marshaled in Auffhammer's 
brief (Br. of Appellant at 6-7). 
PQINT II 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT AUFFHAMMER 
WAS DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
At trial, Auffhammer was convicted of leaving the scene of 
an accident and driving under the influence of alcohol. Utah 
Code Annotated Section 41-6-44(2) (1996 Supp.) sets forth the 
elements of driving under the influence. Two of the elements of 
this offense are at issue here: One, whether Auffhammer was 
"under the influence of alcohol'' and two, whether that influence 
rendered him "incapable of operating a vehicle". Utah Code Ann. 
41-6-44 (2) (a) (ii) . 
A conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol 
requires that a defendant to have consumed alcohol in an amount 
sufficient to render him incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
The only evidence that Auffhammer consumed any alcohol came from 
Rasmussen's testimony that he was "pretty sure" that Auffhammer 
had drank a beer at the party (Tr. at 55). 
In addition, the only evidence of any driving pattern by 
Auffhammer was also Rasmussen's testimony. Rasmussen testified 
that he noticed no driving pattern that would cause him to 
believe that Auffhammer was intoxicated but that he would have 
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handled a previous stop sign differently (Tr. at 41, 59). 
Rasmussen also testified that Auffhammer's speech was not slurred 
prior to the accident and that he could detect no odor of 
alcohol. 
Based upon this evidence, Auffhammer asserts that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that 
he was driving under the influence of alcohol. Auffhammer was 
convicted of driving under the influence, not because of evidence 
indicating that Auffhammer was in physical control of a vehicle 
while impaired by alcohol, but because "the only reason he would 
have left in... that injured condition... instead of waiting for 
medical help was because he was under the influence of alcohol 
and he didn't want to pick up a DUI" (Tr. at 89-90). The trial 
court went so far as to call Auffhammer "a liar" although 
Auffhammer never testified (Tr. at 92). Accordingly, Auffhammer 
asks this court to reverse the driving under the influence 
conviction based upon the clear error in the trial court's 
finding. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Because the conviction for driving under the evidence is not 
supported by the evidence, Auffhammer asks this Court to reverse 
his conviction of that crime. 
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DATED this * * day of November, 1997 
Margaret/P. Lindsay //""~ 
Attorney for Auffhammer 
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